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This time was supposed 'to be different', at least this was the motto of the 2014
European Parliament elections campaign. With less than a year before the next
European elections, the time is ripe to examine how different this EU political cycle
has actually been.
Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process – which established for the first
time a link between the outcome of the EU elections and the presidency of the
EU Commission –, the Juncker Commission emerged as the most political yet. To
shrug off the label of technocratic institution – historically insulated from citizens’
preferences –, the new Commission asked EU citizens to judge its operation by
its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the
Member States alone’. By embracing such a panem et circenses approach to EU
democracy – as such not too dissimilar from the Santer’s and Barroso’s previous
administrations – the Juncker Commission raised new expectations. This is true
not only in terms of output legitimacy – which was meant to become the privileged
benchmark against which to measure the Commission’s success –, but also in
terms of its own democratic and political accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens. Indeed,
although unintelligible to the many, the Spitzenkandidaten logic entails that EU
citizens contributed for the first time with their vote to shape the political orientation
of this Commission and – as a result – could hold it accountable. While the very
notion of political accountability is foreign to the EU constitutional setting – as
citizens don’t have the possibility to replace the Commission if this does not meet
their hopes –, the Juncker Commission has strived to frame its mandate as if such
an oversight existed.
To turn this vision into action, the Juncker Commission revived the so called
Better Regulation Agenda, a rather obscure, legally fuzzy initiative launched in
2002 with the declared aim ‘to simplify and improve the regulatory environment’
and set to ensure that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on
small things’. By choosing Better Regulation – which consists of a set of analytical
tools, such as Impact Assessment, open to participatory input – as its privileged,
accountability-enhancing tool, the Commission sought to identify a renewed optimal
mix between the two major democratic legitimizing mechanisms of EU policymaking:
representative democracy and participatory democracy. Yet, in so doing, it has
inadvertently raised public expectations not only to the whats (output accountability)
but also to the who’s (input accountability) and hows (throughput accountability) of
EU policy-making.
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Input Accountability
When it comes to input accountability, the Better Regulation Agenda has further
expanded the opportunities for stakeholder engagement, without however tapping
into the democratic potential of bottom-up participatory processes. Indeed, despite
the multiplication in recent years of the avenues of participation available to citizens
and other stakeholders – ranging from the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)
to public consultations, including the Lighten the Load and the REFIT Platform
– to shape EU policy-making, the dominant EU participatory model embraced
by the Juncker Commission remains shaped by the neo-corporatist legacy. As
such, it favours organised interests over grassroots input and – as exemplified
by the absence of a European Administrative Procedure Act (or an equivalent) –
it denies procedural rights to influence decision-making. While Better Regulation
institutionalised public participation, it fell short of providing a corresponding
proceduralisation, as suggested by Article 11 TFEU. This inherently restrains the
ability of the EU to pluralise its policymaking.
Due to its self-proclaimed ‘political’ nature, the Juncker Commission seems to
perceive any suggestion to depart from its agreed agenda as a source of distraction
– or even a threat – from delivering on its original political programme. Yet this
is a missed opportunity insofar as participatory procedures may provide citizens
with agenda-setting – as well as monitoring – powers that could complement –
not antagonise – the dominant legitimising force of EU democracy: representative
democracy. Here’s an illustration. The 2018 Stop Glyphosate’s ECI symbolises the
disconnect between the supposedly participatory nature of EU policymaking and its
actual techno-political basis. It shows that while EU citizens have been attributed
the power to contribute to agenda-setting in the EU, via the collection of 1 million
signatures in support of – or against – a given initiative, their stance has no official
bearing – nor institutional linkage to – on an ongoing decision-making process, such
as that of re-authorisation of a substance on the market. If what the ECI demands
and the political preferences of the EU Commission might differ on a given issue,
such a tension explodes and become manifest when the latter preferences are not
only part of a political programme but are also the object of an ongoing political
bargaining. In such circumstances, the Commission finds itself in a situation of
conflict of interest: on the one hand, in the exercise of its own prerogatives – be
they legislative or non-legislative – is called upon to propose the course of action –
or policy option – that it deems more appropriate, on the other, it is responsible for
determining whether an ECI seeking the opposite outcome can be registered and
then, if successful, deserve a follow-up. Yet, in the absence of an institutional bridge,
the participatory process (e.g. hearing of ECI) and the decision-making process (e.g.
adoption of a legislative or non-legislative act) are like ships that pass at night. How
to then expect stakeholders to meaningfully engage with EU decision-making?
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Throughput Accountability
The Better Regulation Agenda has been devised and managed by the EU
Commission Secretariat-General. As such it has not been embraced to the same
degree within and beyond the Commission’s walls. The different level of commitment
to Better Regulation can be detected both at the pre-legislative phase – among
the Commission’s Directorates-General – and at the legislative phase, by the co-
legislators, i.e. the Parliament and the Council. When it comes to the pre-legislative
phase, Better Regulation has been used not only as a quality-enhancing tool in the
preparation of new or revised initiatives, but also and foremost as an instrument of
control. Thus, legislative (e.g. the non-toxic environment strategy, the endocrine
strategy and new environmental action programme) and non-legislative (e.g.
implementing measure on roaming charges) proposals have been withdrawn,
whereas others – despite not being in the political guidelines (e.g. plastics strategy
and controls on single-use plastic) – have been let in. When it comes to the
legislative phase instead, the asymmetric commitment to Better Regulation by the
initiator (the Commission) and the adopters (the Parliament and the Council) of
EU policies was meant to be overcome by the conclusion of the Inter-Institutional
Agreement on Better Law-making. While this new agreement has led to a better
coordination upstream of the policy process – with the three institutions defining
annual lists of priority proposals – and increased the quality and transparency
of the pre-legislative process, this has not translated into an acceleration in the
rate of adoption of Commission proposals by the co-legislators. Moreover, if the
Better Regulation Agenda has increased the scope for holding the EU Commission
accountable for its operation – by both the public and the co-legislators – it has not
necessarily been used towards such an objective.
Output Accountability
As originally announced, the most immediate effect of the Juncker’s Better
Regulation Agenda has been a dramatic decrease of policy output. Based on the
ten priorities of the Juncker Commission, the Commission has succeeded in having
48% of its proposals adopted, with peaks of 100% for its proposals related to 'A
Strong Global Actor' and lows of 25% in relation to 'A deeper and fairer economic
and monetary union': 25% (Adopted: 3, Pending: 9).
When it comes to output accountability, the major commitment of the Juncker
Commission has been to connect its ex-post analysis system – aimed at verifying
whether adopted legislation remains fit for purpose – to the public, via the Regulatory
Fitness and Performance Platform. While this newly-created platform is made by
both Member States and civil society organisations’ representatives, it is tasked to
invite, collect and assess suggestions from all stakeholders – through the Lighten
the Load platform – “on how to reduce regulatory and administrative burden”.
The platform’s operation suggests however that it is not the public but the REFIT
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Platform members who drive the process; a process which is in turn led by the
EU Commission itself in a highly-framed, top-down operation. As such, the overall
increase of the accountability over the legislative output appears modest.
Conclusions
To sum up, the Better Regulation Agenda might have improved the Commission’s
public accountability – with both citizens and stakeholders being better informed
about and engaged with EU policy-making –, without however increasing its
responsiveness to public preferences. This is the case at the input, throughput
and output stage. Rather, the techno-political approach to policymaking – which
characterizes the Juncker’s Better Regulation – might have paradoxically led
to a compression of participatory democracy and somehow chilled stakeholder
engagement. At a time of unprecedented contestation of the EU project – a trend
which is combined by a record-demand for new forms of political representation –,
it appears paradoxical that the EU – an early promoter of participation – is missing
out the chance to seize the momentum to diversify and redesign its participatory
structures being busy delivering on its electoral promises no one will ever judge.
At the very same time the Juncker Commission has been striving to develop its own,
autonomous democratic credentials, its choice to embrace a set of well-defined
institutional mechanisms that reward expert judgment over political adjudication
appears at odds with its newly-acquired political nature.
PS 1: An official assessment of the Better Regulation Agenda is expected to be
published by the first quarter of 2019.
PS 2: It won’t escape the reader’s attention that – despite its subtitle – this piece
does not focus on Martin Selmayr’s role in devising the Better Regulation strategy.
It suffices to say that Mr Selmayr originally devised such a strategy – as the chief
of staff of President Juncker (together with Frans Timmermans, the First Vice-
President of the Commission) –, to then become the guarantor of its implementation
in his new, current role as Secretary-General of the EU Commission. Ironically, the
process that led Selmayr to move from one position to another was found by the EU
Ombudsman “to stretch and possibly even overstretch the limits of the law” and as a
result in breach – on four different accounts – of the principle of good administration.
Far from signalling a triumph of Better Regulation within the EU Commission’s
administration, one must also notice that it is Martin Selmayr – in his new role of
Secretary-General of the EU Commission – who found himself supervising the EU
Ombudsman’s investigation on his own actions. So much for the accountability of the
EU administration vis-à-vis the public (!). To know more about the decision of the EU
Ombudsman, this is available here.
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